The monograph explores US intervention in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti as case studies to determine how the concepts of operational design were applied to peace operations. It also reviews the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini with a comparison to US Army doctrine. The findings are: (1) The concept of center of gravity is most useful in analyzing the friendly situation in order to determine what friendly capability is most important to protect. However, US Army commanders and planners often find it difficult to identify an enemy center of gravity. Often decisive points such as key ports or cities were selected as centers of gravity. Army doctrine for peace operations does not adequately define the concept or explain its applicability. If the concept of center of gravity is the key to successfully achieving ones objectives, it is difficult to understand why Army doctrine does not provide greater detail on its applicability in a peace environment. (2) Lines of operation and decisive points are found to be of greater use in a peace environment in determining how best to achieve the operational objectives. However, in a peace environment, decisive points will be more abstract along logical lines of operation to the achievement of the end state. (3) There must be a change in the military's mental model of how one views the enemy in a peace environment.